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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ABORTION 
Judge Richard Posner, now of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit, is frequently mentioned as a possible candidate for the Supreme Court. 
In his former capacity as a member of the University of Chicago faculty, he was 
perhaps the nation's most influential legal scholar. He is best known as the leading 
figure in the Law and Economics school of legal thought. Among his other interest-
ing and innovative proposals was a suggestion that a market for babies should be 
established. Surely that concept could be taken further. Where, we wondered, 
would it lead? The article might start something like this. 
Abortion is customarily approached as a matter involving 
rights, either of the mother or of the unborn fetus. It is not surpris-
ing that such a crude form of analysis has failed to produce any 
definitive solution, or that the subject has remained highly contro-
versial. As usual, economic analysis is a far more subtle and sophis-
ticated analytical tool. 
Abortion is a classic example of market failure. One of the 
interested parties, the fetus (or, under another philosophical view, 
the person whom the fetus would become if the abortion did not 
take place) is in no position to enter into an arms-length transac-
tion. The adult into whom the fetus would have grown might value 
his life at a higher amount than the parents value the abortion. If 
the fetus had access to the potential assets it could acquire as an 
adult, and it had the bargaining abilities of an adult, it might well be 
able to afford to pay the parents enough to persuade them not to 
have an abortion. Under these circumstances, allowing the abortion 
is economically inefficient. A temporal market barrier prevents the 
economically efficient solution from being attained. 
The solution, however, is not a ban on abortions but the crea-
tion of a market. A representative could be appointed on behalf of 
the fetus to bid against the parents on the abortion decision. Since 
most fetuses have no assets, they would presumably have to borrow 
against their future earnings. If the parents win the bidding war, 
they could have the abortion, but must pay their winning bid into 
the Fetal Bank. If the fetus wins, it is allowed to be born, but some 
share of its future earnings would be paid to the bank. Funds in the 
Bank could be used for loans to fetuses; any excess would be avail-
able either for redistribution (under a liberal regime), or perhaps 
even better, could be invested in embryonic industries. 
Some objections might be raised to this scheme, but rigorous 
analysis shows them to be unfounded. One counterargument is that 
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the poor would be forced to have abortions, since they would not be 
able to outbid their fetuses. But the children of the poor generally 
have low earning capacities; therefore, the fetuses of the poor would 
also be in low income brackets. Impoverished fetuses would be able 
to borrow relatively little money, and hence would be on an equal 
footing with their equally impoverished parents. 
Another possible objection is the existence of externalities. Al-
lowing an abortion offends pro-life individuals. The answer is that 
they too might enter the bidding, along with pro-choice advocates, 
those who wished to adopt the children, those favoring zero popula-
tion growth, and others. 
A more serious objection is that some parents might dishon-
estly claim that they intended to get abortions, only as a way of 
forcing their fetuses to bid against them, and thereby capturing a 
share of the fetus's future earnings. If the fetus's bid were paid to 
the parents, this would be a potentially serious problem. It is pref-
erable, therefore, for the fetus's earnings to be paid only to the 
Bank, thus eliminating the incentive. 
One advantage of this free-market approach is that it mirrors 
some common beliefs about when abortion is more appropriate, or 
at least more understandable. Fetuses with genetic defects would 
have low future earning potential, and thus would often be outbid 
by their parents. Also, the longer the pregnancy continues, the 
shorter the period for which the fetus would need to borrow the 
money; hence, the discounted present value of the fetus's future 
earnings would rise sharply. An abortion late in pregnancy could 
easily require a parent to bid thousands of dollars more than an 
abortion early in pregnancy. Also, since the decision to abort 
would be expensive, there would be a strong incentive for those who 
do not desire children to use contraception. 
Unlike any other proposed approach to the abortion issue, this 
approach gives full weight to the interests of both the fetus and the 
parents. True, those who believe in choice may be disconcerted that 
such a fundamental choice must be paid for, while those who are 
pro-life may be offended that fetuses must bid for their lives.* Still, 
as the great Milton Friedman has told us more than once, "there's 
no free lunch." 
D.A.F. 
• One commentator has said that this approach "seems almost pathological in its disregard of 
the moral values on both sides." Farber, The "Law and Economics" Movement, in RE-
SEARCH IN SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND SOCIAL POLICY (J. Miller & M. Lewis ed. 1986). That 
commentator's work evidences all too clearly a lack of rigorous economic training. 
